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Abstract
It is widely believed that quantum key distribution (QKD) has been proved uncondi-
tionally secure for realistic models applicable to various current experimental schemes.
Here we summarize briefly why this is not the case, from both the viewpoints of fun-
damental quantitative security and applicable models of security analysis, with some
morals drawn.
1 Introduction
After the appearance of papers last year on fundamental QKD security [1] and the complete
breach of concrete QKD systems [2-3], claims have persistently been made [4] that QKD is
already proved unconditionally secure in principle in various models. However, ref [2] and
its extensions [3,5] highlight in a forceful manner the precarious situation of such widespread
claims, especially on concrete experimental systems. Imagine the consequence if the Norway
group kept their detector “blinding attacks” secret and makes them available to selected
parties after a QKD systems has been deployed upon convincing the users its unconditional
or whatever imposing security terminology that has been employed. The fact of the matter
is that the security proofs of the models, assuming the deductions are totally valid (but
they are actually not), contain general and specific assumptions that are simply not satisfied
in practice. Moreover, the security criteria themselves used in the proofs do not guarantee
proper security when satisfied. This paper tries to outline the underlying reasons, and
indicates some ways to deal with the situation.
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2 Security is not merely a matter of definition
Thus far a single-number criterion on a single quantity has been used as the security criterion
in QKD security proofs, from mutual information to trace distance. However, in accord with
detection theory an attacker Eve would obtain from the measurement result on her probe
a whole probability distribution {qj}, j ∈ 1, . . . ,M for the M = 2m possible values of an
m-bit data X from which an n-bit final key K is drawn after the use of an error correction
code (ECC) and a privacy amplification code (PAC). Since PAC is a known hash function,
this distribution {qj} X leads to the distribution {pi} on K, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. A bound on the
mutual information or any single-number criterion on X or K merely expresses a constrain
on {qj} or {pj}.
Since one is using K as if it is uniformly distributed to Eve, i.e., with probability 1
N
for
the N possible key values, one must bound the difference between the probability 2|K˜| of a
uniformly distributed subset of size |K˜| and Eve’s optimum probability pE1 (K˜) of estimating
K˜ correctly in any attack to be below a prescribed security level,
|pE1 (K˜)− 2−|K˜|| ≤ (K˜) for each K˜ ⊆ K (1)
When ε(K˜) can be made sufficiently small, condition (1) gives K the information-
theoretic (IT) “ security” required for meaningful “unconditional security”. Thus, good
security demands semantic security that may not be obtainable quantitatively from another
criterion, especially a single-number criterion that is not bounded tightly enough. Security
is a quantitative issue. It is also not a mere mathematical issue for which one can adopt
whatever mathematical definition that seems intuitively suitable. In particular, it must be
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expressed by Eve’s success probabilities of correctly estimating various properties of K which
can all be derived from (1).
Eve can try to estimate K from just its generation process, the resulting security of K is
called “raw security” to be distinguished from its “composition security” when K is actually
used. General composition security is a complicated matter and we will just restrict our
attention to the case when K is used for encryption, say in the one-time pad format often
suggested. In such situation part of K may be revealed to Eve in a known-plaintext attack
(KPA), which may help her find the rest of K and thus find the rest of the data unknown
to Eve at the beginning, which is encrypted by K to yield the ciphertext. Security against
such leakage of K will be called “KPA security”.
It is important to note that proof of general KPA security is necessary for any claim of
unconditional security on K to be used for encryption. This is because the use of conventional
symmetric key ciphers for key expansion also gives raw IT security, and thus they, not
RSA, are the appropriate conventional ciphers one should compare QKD to. This is a fair
comparison because the use of a shared secret key for message authentication during key
generation is necessary, though not included thus far in the security analysis of any QKD
protocol. (KCQ protocols [6] use a shared secret key explicitly.) In addition, the raw security
of such conventional ciphers is far better than that of concrete QKD systems that have been
studied experimentally or theoretically. The superiority of concrete QKD must lie in its
KPA security, which is the usual security concern because the shared secret key is typically
totally hidden when the data X is uniform to Eve.
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3 Problems of the mutual information criterion
Eve’s accessible information on K from her attack is the most commonly used security
criterion, so far the only one used in all experimental schemes. It is Eve’s mutual information
IE with respect to K under optimal measurement on her probe. Information or entropy
expresses a constraint on Eve’s estimate on the whole distribution {pj} she may get from
the measurement result on her probe. It has been repeatedly pointed out [7,8,1] that there are
distributions consistent with a given IE such that her maximum probability p1 of estimating
the whole key K correctly is given by
p1 ∼ IE
n
≡ 2−l (2)
Thus, unless l ∼ n, the raw security of K so guaranteed may be quite inferior to a uniform
key. The other subsets K˜ of K suffer similarly. The practical values of IE obtained in
experimental schemes indeed gives very large p1 in this sense [1,8].
Under KPA, knowing some bits of K does not render the rest of K more insecure if E has
no quantum memory [1]. If Eve does have quantum memory, possible locking information
would render K insecure [9] or even very insecure [10]. In fact, the latter can be understood
from (2) as follows. The bits on K gained in a KPA could reduce the exponent of p1 in (2).
Indeed, it only takes
l
′
= l + log n (3)
number of bits to change p1 to the value 1 when Eve measures on her probe with this added
information on K.
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The variational distance
δE ≡ δ(P,U) = 1
2
∑
i
|pi − U | (4)
between Eve’s probability distribution {pi} on K averaged over K and the uniform distri-
bution U of n bits has quantitative behavior similar to IE. In particular, when p1 is large
compared to 1
N
,δE could give a p1 as big as the case of δE =
IE
N
, i.e. the value of (2).
Thus, the same problem occurs under KPA as in the case of an IE criterion above. When
δE ≤ ε = 2−l with l ∼ n , good security close to U may be obtained.
4 Problems of the trace distance criterion
The trace distance quantum criterion
1
2
‖ ρ1 − ρ2 ‖1≤ ε (5)
between two density operators ρ1 and ρ2 says that the variational distance between the
two distributions P and Q obtained in a measurement as derived from ρ1 and ρ2 satisfies
δ(P,Q) ≤ ε. Let ρkE be the state of Eve’s probe when the actual K has value k. Then
(5) says, with ρ1 = ρ
k
E and ρ2 = ρU the uniform mixed state with rank N, that for any
measurement Eve may make on her probe one has δE ≤ ε. The problem of such a security
criterion is indicated through δE above.
With ρE = Ek[ρ
k
E], the following trace distance
d =
1
2
‖ ρKE − ρU ⊗ ρE ‖1 (6)
for a joint state ρKE, is used [11] with the interpretation that when d = , it means K equals
U with probability 1−ε to Eve and the value k also becomes independent of ρkE. This implies
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“universal composability” including security against KPA. In ref [14] it has been analyzed
in detail why this interpretation cannot be true with any probability. We can describe the
reason simply as follows.
The main error arises from conclusion in ref [11] that δ(P,Q) =  implies P and Q are
the same distribution with probability 1− ε. This conclusion was derived from the existence
of a joint distribution D that gives P and Q as marginal and yields the above interpretation.
Why would this D arise in the cryptosystem? In fact, even when a joint distribution different
from the product form PQ is in force, why would it be this particular (which is actually
the optimal) one for the interpretation to obtain. In reality, one is simply comparing two
distributions and the joint distribution should be PQ. It is indeed clear directly from the
definition of δ(P,Q) that P and Q must differ when δ(P,Q) = ε > 0.
Sometimes the term “failure probability” is used [12,13] without explicitly saying what
that means. In [14] it is shown that ε does not itself have a probability interpretation. Thus,
it is not any “failure probability”. A related source of this error, which was not discussed in
ref [1], is a misinterpretation of a notion of “ε-indistinguishable” measure. It is concluded
[12] from (5) that ρ1 and ρ2 is “-indistinguishable” and thus the protocol has “failure
probability” ≥ 1− ε. The problem of “ε-indistinguishable” for KPA security guarantee is a
quantitative one similar to (2)-(3) above. A detailed explanation of the whole situation is
given in [15].
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5 True key generation rate and limitation of privacy
amplification
It is important to observe that Eve’s maximum probability q1 on the data X is equal to
her p1 on K, and that p1 cannot be be improved by further PA. This is because a known
transformation from ECC+PAC would just bring the most likely value of the data or key to
a final value of K with the same probability. On the other hand, it is clear from (2) that the
rate of secure key generation is limited to l
n
. Thus, unconditionally secure key generation
rate cannot be given by what has been asserted in the literature, but is determined via the
p1 exponent. Moreover, this rate is determined by q1 and we just saw it cannot be improved
via PA.
In finite protocols – no real protocol operates in the asymptotic limit n→∞ – it makes
little sense to say a quantity grows exponential in n without some estimate of the actual
convergence rate, because any value can be written as exponential in n. It is more accurate
to just say that l secure bits are generated in the round. For concrete protocols l is very
small thus far and may not even cover the message authentication bits used in any normal
IT-secure authentication scheme.
6 True security and asymptotic proof
Note that even with PA to extract semantically secure bits from the p1 exponent, fundamental
security has not been guaranteed. The use of Markov Inequality to convert an average
guarantee to a probable individual guarantee would just reduce the quantitative value that
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has been achieved. Much more significantly, Eve could launch an optimal quantum attack
on specific subset K˜ of K which, because of quantum mechanics, can be superior to what
she may obtain by attacking the whole K and must be bounded in a security proof.
In this connection, it is important to point out that the asymptotic limit that so many
security proofs are based upon both overestimate what the users can achieve and what Eve
can achieve in a finite situation. This is clear information theoretically, because all the
“capacity” like statements involving mutual information are well known to be limiting capa-
bilities. For example, the actual “random coding exponent” or channel reliability function
[16] for finite n, similar to the p1, exponent, is what controls finite system performance, not
the capacities. This applies to both the users and Eve, and is overlooked also in the classical
literature on key generation. Basically, cryptographers should be working with detection
theory, not information theory, for ascertaining performance by any party. Probability has
operational interpretation and is what matters IT wise (but IT in the broad sense), not
any other theoretical quantity like mutual information that needs to be translated back to
probability as done in ref [1,7].
This last point is very important. It shows the possibility of secure key generation is not
determined by any capacity statement. Indeed, in KCQ (keyed communication in quantum
noise) [7] one does not allow coding or indefinitely large n for Eve other than her optimum
decision on a finite-n system. Quantum information locking may help significantly for KCQ
but it is not necessary.
Some details and further elaboration on sections II-VI can be found in [14,15].
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여기에 수식을 
입력하십시오. 
Probabilistic 
pre-detection  
Input state in loss  i Input state in less loss 
Figure 1: Schematic way to eliminate or reduce the effect of loss by user: loss is alleviated
or eliminated with favorable pre-detection outcome.
7 Grave effect of loss on security
Real optical systems have significant loss. If the transmission loss is small one can treat
deleted bits as random errors. Security claim was often made with loss taken into account
just on the throughput via post-detection selection of the detected events. That this is clearly
not a valid inference could be seen from the situation of B92, for which security is totally
breached in an intercept-resend attack when the loss is above a certain threshold determined
by the two signal states, or in any coherent-state BB84 protocol [17].
Generally, the users may try to reduce loss by pre-detection as indicated in Fig. 1, with
success probability itself limited by the loss. Examples include QND measurement and “her-
ald qubit amplifier”. However, Eve also has a similar attack approach, the “probabilistic
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여기에 수식을 
입력하십시오. 
Probabilistic  
re-send  
Input state in loss  i Faked input state  f
Figure 2: Schematic way to take advantage of loss by attacker: a more favorable input state
ρf from Eve’s viewpoint is sought with possible quantum signal detection (PRS attack).
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re-send (PRS) attack” indicated in Fig. 2. Sufficient loss would allow her to cover the deleted
bits in principle and often in practice also. PRS attacks include probabilistic approximate
cloning which is itself a generalization of the attack in ref [17] that is equivalent to proba-
bilistic exact cloning. Note that the possibility of bit deletion from loss violates the usual
information-disturbance tradeoff that underlines QKD security, in that information can be
gained by Eve without causing any relevant disturbance.
While PRS attacks can be covered in a sufficiently general formulation on Eve’s probe, it
is not automatically covered by merely bringing up the possible use of post-detection selection
[18], QND measurement or squashing [19-20], or heralded qubit amplifier [21]. Indeed, it
does not seem a security proof covering all possible PRS attacks in significant loss has ever
appeared. The analysis of ref [22] includes detector inefficiency but not transmission loss.
Absorbing transmission loss in the detector efficiency with ρi replaced by a state without
loss is just the same as post-detection selection, in addition to yielding a possibly very
small detector efficiency. Note that there is no complete security proof in loss even just
under individual attack. This grave consequence of loss on security has been pointed out
previously in [8], and further elaborated in [23].
8 Problems of modeling versus side channel
There are two kinds of mathematical modeling problems in QKD security analysis of concrete
systems:
(A) whether the model includes typical general features of a real cryptosystem;
(B) whether the operative assumptions of the security analysis are satisfied in the real
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system it is applied to.
As an example of (A), the quantum signal state space in any QKD implementation is
never a qubit but an infinite-dimensional boson mode. That a different dimension from two
may breach security is clearly brought out in a specific example [24]. The situation of loss
is discussed above. Thus, all qubit-based security proof is not directly applicable to a real
system, but such security claim was often made on the basis of qubit proofs.
There are many examples of (B), such as the use of threshold detector or Poisson source
model for lasers without phase randomization. Much more significant are the time-shift
attack [25] based on detector efficiency mismatch [26] and the blinding attacks [2-3,5]. De-
tector efficiency mismatch has been dealt with in ref [18]. What is unsettling about the
time-shift attack is that the detailed detection mechanism in the detector can be exploited
to lead to a huge mismatch. The blinding attacks (based on detector controllability by Eve
more essentially than “faked state”) is even more unsettling, because it does not lead to any
common detector imperfection representation and relies on the internal detector electronic
behavior. While the particular possibility of detector blinding can be added in a security
analysis [27], it is not clear how one would know all the relevant internal electronics behavior
have been included in any particular model. Some discussion on similar but more general
modeling question can be found in ref [28]. Note that Fig. 2 can be used to represent timing
and blinding attacks, when the input state itself is already “faked” in a specific way by Eve
and the detector electronic behavior and total system loss may together allow an attack to
succeed.
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In this connection, it may be pointed out that this is not a “side channel” issue as it
is the case with the RSA timing attack. Side channels can be closed once and forever, but
the detector in a QKD system is an integral part of the receiver one must have, part of
the ”main channel”. For example, if a detector leaks radiation of different characteristics
depending on the incoming state, it can be sealed and thus the leak is a side channel. But
the detection mechanism is not a side channel. Another point is that a side channel would
not affect the original cryptosystem representation, surely the case also for the RSA timing
attack. However, the system model has to be extended to include the time-shift attack and
blinding attack [27]. To what extent must one model the internal behavior of a detector,
or any system component, so that the resulting security analysis captures all the relevant
features of the cryptosystem, instead of getting new surprises from time to time? If this
question is not settled there will be no security proof for any concrete QKD system even
just in principle, whatever else one may have achieved. The detector representation problem
goes beyond (B) and squarely to (A) above, an issue of completeness of the cryptosystem
model.
There are other systems that are not subject to such detector based attacks, including
continuous variable QKD which is, however, not yet proved secure according to the standard
view in the literature [13]. The KCQ approach [6] is also immune to such attacks, especially
Y00 in any of the formats (PSK, ISK, QAM) that have been studied, because there is
essentially no deleted bit. However, general IT security has not been established for any
KCQ protocol.
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9 Outlook
Security is a serious matter and cannot be established experimentally. We see in the above
that, just in principle, fundamental quantitative security has not been properly addressed
in QKD security analysis and the effect of loss has not been properly accounted for. The
widespread perception of proven QKD security is based on several omission or errors of
reasoning:
(i) No proven security against known-plaintext attack when the generated key K is used
for encryption;
(ii) Use of single-number constraint on the attacker’s probability distribution on K when
the number is not or cannot be bounded tightly enough;
(iii) Not including all possible attacks in the presence of significant transmission loss;
(iv) Not including relevant device characteristics.
The situation is summarized in the following Table 1:
There are two ways to deal with these problems. The first is to limit one’s claim, for
example to known-plaintext attacks with no quantum memory. One can, say, wait an hour
before using the generated key. One can ignore joint attacks that require entanglement across
modes either in the probe or in the measurement. The resulting KPA security appears prov-
able for at least KCQ protocols and would still represents major progress beyond what can be
obtained with standard ciphers. In any case it is better to avoid misleading terminology like
“unconditional”, “no signaling”, and “device independent”. Generally, a more careful and
critical attitude in making security claim would be appropriate. The second way is to look
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Perceived Real
raw security of K during
key generation
criterion d ≤ 2−l implies K is per-
fect with probability ≥ 1− 
probability Eve gets a sub-
set K˜ ⊆ K can be as big as
2−l
composition security of K
against known-plaintext at-
tack when used in encryp-
tion
criterion d ≤ 2−l implies K is per-
fect withprobability ≥ 1− 
d is not the proper criterion
privacy amplification given Eve’s entropy can make d
small and hence improve security
cannot improve p1, Eve’s
maximum probability of
getting the whole K
key generation rate H(A|B)−H(A|E) exponent r of p1 ∼ 2−rn
determination of security by analysis of entropy hierarchy
with respect to criterion d
by bounding Eve’s success
probabilities
effect of transmission loss on
security
reduction of key rate but not se-
curity
many possible attacks by
Eve not accounted for
modeling of cryptosystem
photon detector
a side channel issue part of the completeness is-
sue in original system repre-
sentation
Table 1: QKD Security Situation
for new approaches or major modification of existing ones. In particular, we need a general
proof that device internal electronics cannot lead to security loopholes in the protocol.
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Note added for v.4: For new developments on the topics of sections II–IV, see [29]-[30].
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